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Summary findings
Broadman and Recanatini explore the labor dynamics of  industrial sectors in Russia's 89 regions indicates that the
Russian enterprise restructuring, empirically assessing  typical firm has experienced only modest downsizing-
how patterns of job creation and destruction are related  about  12 percent-in  number of employees. Smaller
to various aspects of enterprise restructuring across firms  firms have entered, and larger, mature businesses have
in different sectors and regions, and to different forms,  exited some sectors. Except for a lull in 1998, the rate of
sizes, vintages, and performance characteristics of  job creation has steadily increased and the rate of job
ownership.  destruction  has declined, dropping substantially in 1998-
Evidence from case studies-based  on more than 50  99.  "Voluntary" worker separations remain the main-
site visits in 2000-suggests  that jobs have been  and growing-form  of layoff, and the proportion  of
destroyed, but only to a limited degree in some sectors  layoffs through redundancies is shrinking (now about 4
and regions, largely because of institutional and incentive  percent of total separations).
constraints and a still-widespread "socialist" corporate  Firm size and net employment growth  are not
culture. Jobs have been created-particularly  in sectors  statistically related, but form of ownership seems to
where devaluation had the most pronounced  effect on  matter. Firm size is also statistically correlated
import substitution and export promotion-but  only  (positively) with profitability, but restructuring through
slowly, mostly for lack of skilled workers and because  changes in net employment growth appears not to be. It
regional mobility is limited. Labor turnover appears  seems Russian restructuring  needs to become more
higher within regions than across regions.  efficient.
Newly available data for 1996-99  (provided by
Goskomstat) for about  128,000 enterprises in 24
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I. Introduction
Despite recent  signs of economic  recovery, due  in large part to  devaluation of the ruble and
increased world oil prices, Russia still faces a daunting challenge to restructure its enterprises.  Nowhere
is this restructuring task more difficult than in dealing with the immense problem the Russian authorities
inherited from the socialist system of ensuring that workers  have value-enhancing jobs  and a vibrant,
flexible labor market that  operates  according to  competitive principles. The ability of  Russia's  labor
market to adapt efficiently to change, where workers are reallocated to boost productivity and output, is
critical to  achieve sustainable  growth. A  dynamic  labor market-one  that  facilitates "job creation" in
productive enterprises and "job destruction" in unproductive enterprises-is  an important factor for all
countries making the transition from a centrally planned to a market system.
The record of job creation and job  destruction across transition countries has differed greatly.
Many Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have experienced substantial layoffs by state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) and a relatively large reallocation of labor from less efficient to more efficient sectors
of the economy.'  The Russian experience, however, has developed along a different path. At the advent
of its transition to a market system following the break-up of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, Russia
experienced a major decline in output.  It was against this backdrop that Russia's  authorities first faced
the task of reallocating labor (as well as capital) from insolvent state enterprises towards more productive
uses.  The federal government began to deregulate wages, abolish guaranteed employment, and reduce
formal labor mobility constraints (however all such constraints were not eliminated at the regional level).
Perhaps most important, in light of the  fact that virtually all  aspects of peoples'  livelihood and  social
services were tied to the enterprise sector, the authorities initiated a major drive to privatize state owned
enterprises  in order to  both facilitate restructuring of SOEs and  the emergence of new private firms,
which in other countries have been major sources of job creation.
But  Russia's  privatization  initiatives  have  not,  for  the  most  part,  led  to  major  competitive
restructuring of incumbent enterprises.  Nor has the country experienced significant growth of de novo
private sector business, especially compared to other transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe. 2
Predictions  of initial large-scale layoffs or dramatic increases in unemployment did not materialize  in
Russia, and employment adjustment was small relative to output declines.  Consistent with this outcome,
rates of job destruction during Russia's  early transition years were lower than expected , although they
have gradually increased over time, and over-manning is still a widespread phenomenon. 3
There are several reasons why the restructuring of Russian enterprises has been partial and why
new private sector start-ups are struggling to emerge, which, in turn, has translated into relatively limited
reallocation of labor. 4 The mode of privatization most commonly used relied  on worker-management
buyouts and thus may not have provided adequate incentives for existing firms to restructure and layoff
' See IMF,  2000;  OECD,  1997.
2 The chapters  in Broadman  (1999)  diagnose  this issue.
3  Jackman  (1998);  IMF,  2000.
4See  Broadman  (2000).
2workers. 5 Private sector start-ups, particularly small and medium enterprises (SMEs), have faced several
barriers to entry, especially at the local level. These include institutional impediments, such as arduous
licensing, registration and  inspection  requirements,  corruption, and  inadequate  legal mechanisms  for
dispute resolution.  Entry has also been blocked by the lack of a competitive environment, engendered by
large  incumbent enterprises, who  retain  the  structural advantages that  come from market  dominance,
favored access to infrastructure services and protection from inter-regional trade and investment; and by
financial sector barriers, which, stemming from the lack of an effective banking system that intermediates
saving into investment, have prevented access to credit on commercial terms. Continued state-engendered
or state-sponsored "soft" budget constraints on enterprises-in  the guise of fiscal subsidies, government
tolerance  (indeed  generation)  of  non-payments,  and  the  absence  of  a  financial  system  adhering  to
commercial  lending  practices-also  have  worked  to  limit  cost  minimization  incentives  faced  by
managers.  At the same time, pressure on employers from local governments to maintain employment and
reduce the political, social and economic consequences of "open unemployment" has led enterprises to be
reluctant to layoff significant amounts of redundant workers.  Indeed, keeping a large number of workers
on their payrolls may also give enterprise managers more political clout in channeling resources towards
themselves.  It  is  also  apparent  that  many  managers  have  acted  paternalistically  in  maintaining
employment inasmuch as significant lay-offs would increase poverty among their workers, particularly as
the unemployment insurance system does not have adequate resources or sufficient capacity to channel
resources to eligible groups.
It has been widely reported that in the years since Russia's  debt default and devaluation of the
ruble in August 1998 and the increase in world oil prices, these two factors have produced a significant
effect  on  enterprise restructuring,  fostering job  destruction and  creation, particularly  in the country's
manufacturing sector.  Indeed, in the aggregate, both separations and new hiring seem to have increased,
with  the  rate  of  hiring coming  closer  in  2000  to  the  rate  of  separations-although  with  apparent
differences across sectors, regions, firm  size and  other characteristics that  have yet to be systemically
documented. Moreover, aggregate data for 2000 show a decline in unemployment. In short, since 1991
the Russian labor market generally has been characterized by only a modest decline in the hiring rates by
state enterprises, with relatively few large layoffs, and by limited inter-sectoral reallocation of workers.
Labor hoarding has been widespread, while the new private sector has struggled to emerge.
This paper explores the recent dynamics of Russia's  labor market in order to help design policies
to improve its functioning during Russia's  continuing transition.  To do this it is necessary to unbundle at
the firm level the determinants of job creation and destruction in Russian enterprises.  Our approach in
this regard is to  systematically assess  empirically the patterns of job creation and destruction over the
period 1996-1999 among a large sample of Russian manufacturing businesses in all of the country's  89
regions.  We analyze how the patterns  of job creation and destruction  at the firm-level are related to
various aspects of enterprise restructuring across businesses in different  sectors and  regions, and with
different ownership forms, size, vintage, and performance characteristics.
The main source of our data are official data provided by Goskomstat, Russia's  State Statistical
Agency.  Economists have struggled to measure the "true" degree of firm restructuring and private sector
development  in  all  transition economies  (Russia  included).  The limits of  official  data collected  by
government statistical agencies are well-known: a bias toward medium and large enterprises, a lack of
systematic information on worker-hours, and perverse incentives for businesses to mis-report employment
data. (In an attempt to overcome these limits, some researchers have used survey data. 6)  Thus, we stress
at the outset that our dataset has limitations: the enterprises included in the sample are for the most part
medium and  large  size  enterprises.  This  biases  our  sample and  our  conclusions  towards  the  labor
5 Nellis  (1998)  provides  an overview.
6  See, among others, Faggio and Konings (1999); Bilsen and Konings (1998); Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2000).
3dynamics  of  large,  well-established  enterprises  rather  than  of  small  start-up  firms.  There  may  be
additional measurement issues due to the incentives enterprises have to mis-report to Goskomstat. To
overcome some of these limits, we integrate the official data with detailed information gathered through a
series of face-to-face case studies of enterprises located in eight of Russia's  regions, carried out during
2000. Despite these words of caution, the Goskomstat data set provides unique and rich information on
the labor market across 89 Russian oblasts over a period of four years. The use of these data enables us to
carry out a more structured statistical investigation of Russian job creation and destruction and enterprise
restructuring than has been performed in the past.
The rest  of the paper  is structured  as follows.  In Section  II we describe  briefly some basic
stylized facts regarding job creation and destruction in Russia and compare Russia's  experience to other
transition economies.  Section III analyzes the initial economic conditions and institutional arrangements
existing in the Russian labor market to better understand the issues surrounding the determinants of job
creation and destruction.  Motivated by this  discussion, Section IV presents qualitative evidence from
newly gathered firm-level data based on the set of regional case studies.  The case study results set the
stage for the  quantitative analysis of the  Goskomstat data presented in Section VI.7  We conclude the
paper in Section VII with a detailed summary of our findings.
II.  Stylized Facts on Job Reallocation in Russia
To assess the flexibility of the Russian  labor market and its link to enterprise restructuring, we
concentrate on the behavior of job flows throughout the 1990s, and particularly focus on the period just
prior to and subsequent to the economic crisis, devaluation and debt default of 1998.  We set the stage for
the empirical investigation carried out by first discussing some salient stylized facts on job reallocation
observed in Russia (as well as in other transition economies).
Table 1 and Figure 1 present data on the trends in new hiring and separations in Russia's  economy
from  1993 to  1999.  It is apparent that  in the  industrial sector, except for  1999, both new hiring and
separations were quite flat.  Only  in  1999 does it appear that new hirings have increased, narrowing
significantly the gap between hiring and  separations.  These are trends we will explore in greater detail
below with the newly available firmn-level  data.
Table 1. Aggregate Data on Labor Turnover in the Russia
(Labor  Turnover  as percent  of Total  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
Employment)
New  Hiring  21.1  20.8  22.6  18.9  19.9  21.0  23.9
Of which:  in industry  20.1  18.2  21.1  16.9  19.2  19.8  27.4
Separations  25.1  27.4  25.7  23.9  24.5  24.9  24.2
Of which:  in industry  28.8  32.0  28.4  27.0  26.8  27.7  27.0
Data in percentage.  Source: IMF, 2000.
7A  description  of the statistical  data set is presented  in Appendix  1;  Appendix  2 defines  the basic  measures  ofjob
creation  and destruction  utilized.
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More generally, to what extent has the Russian labor market been showing increasing flexibility as
the transition process has progressed?  Until recently, the answer to this question could not be definitive
since firm-level  data on job  flows for  Russia have  been  limited.  Labor market phenomena  are best
measured using micro data, which are not easily available in Russia.  To date, the most important sources
of micro data on Russian job flows generally were from either specialized (usually one-time) firm-level
surveys (such as Konings and  Walsh (1999)8 and  Foley (1997)9 or specialized compilations using  data
from Goskomstat, such as OECD (1997).  These data are summarized in Table 2 and they  suggest that
although Russia's  labor market has been changing, compared to other transition economies, rates ofjob
creation and destruction are lagging behind.
Table 2.  Job Flows in Russia Compared to Selected Transition Economies
Country  (years)  Job Creation  Job  Job  Net Employment
l________________  _  |__  Destruction  Reallocation  Growth
Transition Economies
Poland  (94-97)  3.0%  3.7%  6.7%  -0.6%
Estonia (93-97)  9.3%  8.8%  18.1%  0.6%
Slovenia (93-97)  3.3%  5.4%  8.8%  -2.1%
Bulgaria (94)  1.4%  5.2%  6.6%  -3.7%
Romania (93-97)  3.7%  9.9%  13.6%  -6.2%
Hungary (94)  1.3%  6.6%  7.9%  -5.3%
Ukraine (96)  2.5%  15.3%  18.0%  -12.0%
Russia
Russia (96)  1.2%  4.9%  6.1%  -3.7%
Source:  Compiled  by the authors  from  data  in:  OECD, 1997; Faggio  and  Konings  1999;  Konings  and  Walsh,  1999.,
Bilsen  and Konings,  1998;  Davis  et al, 1996. From  different  data sets;  not fully  comparable.
Note: Job Reallocation  = Job Creation  + Job Destruction;  Net Employment  Growth  = Job Creation  - Job Destruction
8 The rates were  calculated  using  survey  data from  150 enterprises  collected  in the fall of  1997.
9 The rates were  calculated  using  data  from the Russian  Longitudinal  Monitoring  Survey,  a household-based  survey.
Round  1 of the  survey was implemented  in 1992, while  the last  Round  was implemented  in 1996.
5The OECD, relying on 1997 Goskomstat data, provided some evidence of labor movements taking
place in Russia. But these data suggest that as of 1997 deep restructuring of large and medium enterprises
had not yet fully materialized.  Goskomstat statistics, however, include only limited information on  the
smallest enterprises and none  on firms operating in the shadow economy.  This may bias short-term job
creation rates downward since it is likely that  smaller enterprises absorb a portion of workers separated
from larger, restructuring enterprises.  Fieldwork we have carried out suggests that small firms often hire
directly from  large and  medium enterprises,  creating a shift  of labor within  industry and  facilitating
restructuring.
To compensate for the potential bias in the Goskomstat data, some researchers have relied on small
firm-level surveys to obtain a more representative picture of the Russian labor market.  These survey data
provide preliminary evidence that job destruction is much higher, and job creation lower, than the official
data suggest-although  job creation is still relatively low compared to other countries. (See Table 3)
Table 3. Differentials in Russian Labor Market Indicators
Source  Job creation  Job destruction
(Year)  1994  1995  1994  1995
Goskomstat  0.7  0.9  7.3  4.0
Faggio  - Konings  1.2  4.9
Russian  Economic  Barometer  Surveys  1.0  1.7  15.9  10.1
Data in percentage
Until now the data available on Russia's  labor market has not provided sufficient information to
reconcile these  existing pieces of evidence and to  assess systematically over time, across  sectors and
inter-regionally the factors that are influencing changes in Russian job creation and destruction.  We help
fill  this  vacuum  by  offering  a  more  complete  analysis  of  the  Russian  labor  market  and  enterprise
restructuring.  We do so by using new firm-level data from (i) a larger and more comprehensive data set
from Goskomstat than heretofore has been the case, and complementing those data with (ii) new data on
smaller firms from a series of detailed qualitative case-studies of individual Russian businesses that we
developed in the field in 2000.
III. Initial Conditions:  Effects on Institutions Russia's Enterprises and Labor Market
The incentives and constraints on enterprise restructuring and the operation of the labor market in
Russia are a function of the initial economic  conditions at the start of the country's  transition and the
institutional environment.
An important attribute of the centrally planned Soviet economy at the time of the founding of the
Russian Federation was the artificial geographical distribution of enterprises, the location of which often
had less to do with market signals-demand,  supply and, in turn, prices-than  with the administrative
preferences  of the  State. 10 Industries were  often  very  localized and  unevenly distributed across the
country.  Interregional trade and investment were largely nonexistent.  One-company towns are perhaps
the most visible manifestation of this."  Today Russia's  economy is still characterized by these features:
there  is a  hangover  from the  earlier drive for  regional  autarky  and  self-sufficiency, with large  firms
'1  Hanson  and Bradshaw  (forthcoming  2001)
IMC  Consulting  (1999)
6exhibiting excessive vertical integration, protected by local government barriers to interregional trade and
investment. 1 2
Not  surprisingly, by  reflection,  the  hallmark of  the  Soviet labor  market  was the  presence  of
significant disparities across regions.  Most of what is now the Russian Federation experienced chronic
excess demand for labor, while few areas (especially the Central Asian Republics) were characterized by
excess supply of labor and open unemployment.  Enterprises were continuously searching for additional
workers to hire,  and guaranteed permanent employment contracts to all workers because it was in the
interest of firms to engage in labor hoarding.
Throughout  the  more  than  eight  years  following  the  dismantling  of  the  Soviet  system,  the
regionally-specialized  structure  of the  economy  has  had  a  profound  impact  on  the  response  of  the
country's  labor market to the reform process.3 3 The initial economic disparities across regions arid the
uneven impact of the reform process on industrial sectors has led to labor gaps across Russia's geography.
Over much of this period through the present, regional variations in unemployment rates are extremely
high and not declining (see Table 4).
In past years labor turnover exhibited significant regional variations (OECD, 1997).  In 1995, for
example, separation rates varied from 9.6% in Dagestan to 40.6% in Sakhalin.  Gimpelson and Lippoldt
(1997) suggest that separations and hiring differences are strongly correlated with the advances made in
the transition process.  The regional  differences  in labor turnover  seem to closely resemble  regional
differences in economic development and standards of living.  Older, historically Russian regions, lagging
behind in the transition to market (such as Voronezh, Penza and Kursk) appear to display the lowest rates
of labor turnover.  Indeed in the past, labor turnover has been high within regions, but not across regions.
This is likely due to institutional constraints, for example enterprise-tied housing.
More generally, the institutions and regulations directly governing the labor market greatly affect
job  reallocation by  either  creating  incentives or imposing  constraints  on  employers'  and  employees'
decisions.  The Russian labor market is still governed by the 1971 Soviet version of the Labor Code.  This
code contains a myriad of detailed rules regulating many aspects of the employer-employee relationship.
In practice, however, the importance of this law has declined since 1991 due to discrepancies between the
code's unrealistically rigid provisions and the needs of a growing market economy.  This has resulted in
lack of enforcement  of the  minimum wage,  high  incidence of illegal administrative  leave, and  wage
arrears.
Nonetheless, enterprises are still responsible to provide non-wage social benefits to their employees
and face severe legal restrictions in severing labor contracts.  The lack of reforms in the social sector has
also helped to maintain serious rigidities in the labor market."'  Thus, the anachronistic Labor Code, the
inadequacy of the social safety net, and significant political pressures-especially  at the local level--have
constrained labor movements and prevented the much needed restructuring of firms.
12 Broadman  (2000)
3 Orttung  (2000).
14 An interesting  example  of successful  labor  market  reforms  paired  with  social  programs  is Estonia. For a detail
discussion,  see Haltiwanger  and Vodopevec  (1999).
7Table  4.  Russian  Unemployment  Rate  by Regions  (ILO  methodology),  1993-99
(in percent of labor force)
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
Northern Region
Karelian Republic  7.8  8.7  13.2  11.5  11.9  16.6  15.8
Komi Republic  4.9  9.3  10.9  10.4  13.9  17.8  16.1
Arkhangel'sk Oblast  6.1  9.7  11.0  12.0  12.4  14.9  14.9
Nenets Autonomous Okrug  ---  13.3  11.3  20.1
Vologodsk Oblast  4.2  7.6  8.8  8.0  10.5  12.7  11.8
Murmansk Oblast  6.5  9.1  12.4  14.7  18.5  21.0  16.3
North-western Region
Saint Petersburg  8.0  9.9  10.6  10.3  9.9  11.3  11.0
Leningrad Oblast  6.7  9.4  10.2  10.0  12.8  15.0  14.8
Novgorod Oblast  5.8  8.3  10.2  9.1  13.5  15.4  14.5
Pskov Oblast  7.9  12.4  12.2  13.7  14.2  16.1  14.1
Central Region
Bryansk Oblast  4.7  8.8  9.4  8.2  12.9  15.7  16.7
Vladimir Oblast  5.9  10.0  13.1  11.5  11.6  12.0  13.1
Ivanovo Oblast  8.4  13.6  14.6  16.5  16.9  18.8  17.7
Kaluzhska Oblast  5.1  5.7  8.3  7.8  11.2  10.2  11.6
Kostromska Oblast  8.1  9.5  9.4  9.9  9.4  11.2  10.1
Moscow  6.5  7.7  7.0  6.3  4.8  4.8  5.6
Moscow Oblast  5.1  7.0  7.9  7.6  8.8  9.9  10.7
Orlov Oblast  4.5  6.5  8.0  9.6  9.8  13.2  9.2
Ryazan Oblast  5.1  6.6  6.7  6.4  10.1  7.1  12.8
Smolensk Oblast  6.5  7.8  10.2  11.3  12.9  16.4  14.2
Tver Oblast  4.0  6.7  8.2  5.7  9.9  11.3  10.4
Tula Oblast  4.1  6.7  6.2  6.9  10.0  11.6  11.6
Yaroslavl Oblast  5.6  8.5  12.1  10.8  8.8  11.1  8.8
Volga Region
Marii-El Republic  4.8  9.4  11.8  11.3  18.0  13.1  10.8
Mordoviya Republic  6.3  8.1  11.6  13.1  12.2  14.5  12.8
Chuvash Republic  7.1  10.0  10.2  11.1  13.9  13.9  13.9
Kirov Oblast  6.1  9.7  9.2  8.9  11.4  13.1  10.1
Nizhegorod Oblast  5.2  6.6  8.7  9.0  9.7  9.1  7.7
Central-Chernozem Region
Belgorod Oblast  4.4  5.5  6.1  6.6  10.7  11.3  13.1
Voronezh Oblast  4.4  5.6  8.2  9.2  8.1  9.5  12.5
Kurst Oblast  3.8  6.4  6.1  7.4  8.1  10.2  11.5
Lipetsk Oblast  5.2  5.7  6.3  6.7  9.8  11.1  11.1
Tambov Oblast  5.8  7.5  10.6  11.1  12.9  12.7  14.3
Povolgski Region
Kalmykiya Republic  9.1  12.1  22.2  14.5  26.1  30.8  25.5
Tatarstan Republic  3.6  6.1  6.5  6.5  7.9  10.9  11.4
Astrakhan Oblast  7.3  9.7  14.7  12.8  14.6  15.9  14.1
Volgograd Oblast  5.6  7.6  11.5  11.2  50.0  14.7  12.5
Penzensk Oblast  6.4  8.9  13.9  14.9  12.0  18.1  11.6
Samara Oblast  4.6  6.3  8.0  8.7  9.3  8.6  12.4
Saratov Oblast  5.9  8.9  10.4  10.5  15.8  16.1  11.2
Ulyanov Oblast  4.8  6.5  8.3  8.2  9.8  11.1  9.2
Continued  on next page.
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North-Kaukaz Region
Adygeya Republic  8.0  13.0  12.4  11.1  12.3  16.0  21.1
Dagestan Republic  17.5  18.0  25.3  27.7  27.0  30.0  31.2
Ingush Republic  --  43.1  32.2  58.2  51.1  51.8
Kabardino-Balkar Republic  9.6  14.3  14.3  17.1  17.7  22.4  28.2
Karachaev-Circassian Republic  9.6  11.3  27.4  20.8  18.9  25.5  22.4
North Ossetian-Alaniya Republic  23.3  30.1  22.2  26.6  33.4
Chechen Republic
Krasnodarsk Krai  7.2  8.6  9.3  10.7  16.5  16.2  15.9
Stavropol Krai  6.2  5.6  9.4  9.8  13.9  16.3  19.2
Rostov Oblast  5.6  7.8  8.5  8.5  12.0  15.7  18.5
Ural
Bashkortostan Republic  4.3  6.7  7.8  7.9  11.2  13.4  12.5
Udmurt Republic  6.2  8.7  13.1  12.1  13.1  11.6
Kurgan Oblast  5.6  9.5  8.4  10.2  12.5  13.1  13.4
Orenburg Oblast  3.3  6.2  7.5  5.5  9.5  13.4  14.2
Perm Oblast  5.7  8.4  9.0  8.8  11.1  13.0  14.3
Komi-Permyatsk Autonomous Okr  ---  ---  17.6  17.4  10.5
Sverdlovsk Oblast  6.2  8.2  8.5  8.5  10.2  10.5  13.9
Chelyabinsk Oblast  6.5  8.2  8.2  8.7  9.5  12.4  12.0
West Sibera
Altai Republic  9.3  13.5  9.9  13.2  18.4  18.5  19.4
Altai Krai  6.7  8.4  11.1  10.7  13.9  16.0  13.1
Kemerovo Oblast  4.9  7.2  6.6  6.8  11.2  12.5  13.8
Novosibirsk Oblast  6.7  8.1  10.1  8.9  10.7  13.7  15.0
Omsk Oblast  5.4  7.6  5.4  7.0  13.4  15.5  15.0
Tomsk Oblast  7.6  10.2  7.9  7.9  12.8  14.6  16.5
Tyumen Oblast  5.1  7.5  6.9  9.2  8.9  14.0  11.3
Khanti-Mansi Autonomous Okrug  ---  ---  12.5  14.4  11.3
Yamalo-Nenetsk Autonomous Okr  ---  ---  10.7  11.2  10.0
East Sibera
Buryat Republic  5.8  9.8  15.1  14.6  21.3  22.1  18.1
Tyva Republic  6.5  11.0  21.4  18.1  22.0  20.9  26.0
Khakasian Republic  4.6  6.2  8.7  11.6  13.0  9.6  16.1
Krasnoyarsk Krai  5.4  8.3  9.0  8.1  13.3  16.4  14.3
Taimyrsk Autonomous Okrug  7.0  15.6  9.7
Evenkisk Autonomous Okrug  ---  3.4  5.9  7.2
Irkutsk Oblast  6.2  8.3  8.9  11.2  14.4  13.7  15.1
Ust-Ordinsk Buryat Autonomous  ---  7.7  8.4  14.9
Chitinsk Oblast  5.8  7.1  9.2  14.9  18.5  20.4  21.0
Aginsk Buryat A. Okrug  ---  28.1  35.7  23.5
Far East Region
Sakha Republic (Yakutiya)  3.9  6.0  7.1  6.7  12.6  13.6  13.9
Jewish Autonomous Oblast  5.6  11.7  17.0  12.6  25.1  23.9  19.0
Chukotsk A. Oblast  ---  ---  ---  8.4  4.7  9.3
Primorye Krai  5.4  7.5  10.0  9.6  13.3  14.9  13.7
Khabarovsk Krai  6.8  9.2  11.4  12.1  12.7  12.4  14.4
Amur Oblast  5.3  8.7  13.4  11.0  15.6  16.9  16.4
Kamchatka Oblast  5.6  9.7  6.8  7.0  12.5  17.6  18.2
Koryak Autonomous Okrug  6.8  8.4  8.9
Magadan Oblast  6.3  10.9  9.7  10.4  13.6  18.1  20.6
Sakhalin Oblast  8.0  9.9  11.3  10.9  15.0  17.1  20.7
Kaliningrad Oblast  7.1  9.6  9.2  13.9  11.5  16.7  15.9
Source: IMF, 2000.
9For the economy as a whole, in light of the limited flexibility of the Russian labor market, it is not
surprising that gross employment adjustments have been well behind movements in aggregate output, as
depicted in Table  5 and Figure 2.  The rate of unemployment has increased almost steadily since the
beginning of the  transition,  reflecting considerable  excess  labor  and constraints  to  lay-offs and  new
business entry.  Importantly, in the past year this trend appears to have been stabilized and even begun to
reverse, owing, in part, to the strong growth in GDP in the wake of the August 1998 devaluation and the
rise in world oil prices.
Table 5. GDP and Unemployment in Russia, 1991-99
(mual  average)ls  6  -14-5  2  1994  1996  g  1 
Source:  IMF, 2000.
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Source:  authors'  calculations  from  IMF  (2000).
From a structural policy perspective, however, the key determinants explaining these trends-both
in the past and what the future may portend-lie  at the microeconomic level. In particular, the focus must
be on  analyzing which  factors  most  directly  influence  the  linkages  between enterprise  restructuring
(including business formation), on the one hand, and job creation and destruction, on the other.  The first
prong  of our analytical  approach is to present the results  of a  series of qualitative case  studies.  The
second prong is to analyze statistically the firm-level data set assembled by Goskomstat.
15 Percentage  change  in real  termns.
16 Percentage  change,  in per cent of labor  force;  calculated  according  to the ILO definition.
10IV.  Case-Study Evidence
In-depth interviews of general directors and other senior management of more than 70 enterprises
and banks were carried out in 2000 in eight Russian regions:  Krasnodar Kraii, Leningrad Oblast, St.
Petersburg city, Moscow  Oblast, Moscow city, Novgorod  Oblast, Novosibirsk Oblast,  and Primorskii
Kraii.  We summarize here the key findings from these case studies.
Some  job destruction  has  occurred,  but  many  firms  are  still  over-employed.  The  majority  of  the
managers interviewed indicated that the level of employment in their enterprises has declined since the
beginning  of the  transition  in the  early  1990s.  But  most  also  indicated that  more  downsizing  was
necessary to  bring the  scale  of plants  in  line with  market  conditions.  Thus  further  restructuring of
incumbent enterprises was deemed necessary.  The limited reduction in personnel observed was attributed
for the most part to retirements and voluntary separations rather than to actual lay-offs at the managers'
initiative.  It  was apparent  that  due  to  political pressure  and  a  lingering  Soviet "corporate  culture",
managers responded to the worsening in economic conditions and the decline in demand by accumulating
wage arrears, shortening employees'  workday and imposing forced leave without pay or with partial pay,
rather than laying off employees.  At the same time, some of managers interviewed conceded that, given
the actual demand for their firms'  products, their enterprises are still over-manned by at  least 10-15%.
This trend of implicit or temporary unemployment is especially common among well-established, older
enterprises (either SOEs, or privatized  firms) in the more traditionally  manufacturing sectors.  Certain
distortions in the policy environment, for example the tax regime, also play a role in creating incentives
and constraints on job destruction; see Box 1.
Although  some  job creation  has  materialized,  there  is potential  for much  more.  In contrast  with
the evidence gathered regarding the older enterprises, including previously privatized firns,  newcomers
in the market, particularly de novo  smaller firms, appear to have been at the forefront of creating new
jobs-although  it is too early tell from the interviews how durable these new jobs will be (i.e., whethler  or
not there is net positive employment growth).  Job creation was found to be particularly strong in light
industry, especially enterprises  in the food, retail  and information technology (IT)  sectors, and  also in
natural resource-related firms (those in or associated with oil or natural gas).  Moreover, the creation of
new jobs appears to be more marked since the 1998 devaluation, likely because of the import substitution
effects, particularly in trade-sensitive sectors, for example, timber and wood processing.
Box 1. Is It Real Job Reallocation? A Construction Firm in Moscow Oblast
Established  in the  early  1950s,  this  large  company  producing  construction  materials  has  undergone  several
transformations  since 1991. To be able to survive  the worsened  economic  conditions  and minimize  the burden  of
taxation, the senior management decided to divide the original company into about 30 separate enterprises.  These
firms are de facto  departments of the "mother" company, but are legally separate entities.  The newly established
firms and the mother company are in constant re-organization depending on the needs of the mother company and
changes in tax incentives and credits available to small businesses.  The "subsidiary"  companies are kept "alive"
until they are profitable and then are closed down.  Workers, on the other hand, have been continuously movecl from
one subsidiary to another, displaying trust toward the management and a great level of mobility, since each time a
subsidiary closes down, the employees are laid-off with simply the implicit understanding that they will be later re-
hired  in another subsidiary.  Nonetheless this  fictitious closing  down  and  opening  of  the  subsidiaries,  and  the
continuous flows and reflows of employees between different jobs-apparently  largely on the basis of tax incentives
and disincentives-leads  to significantly distorted measures of job creation and destruction.
Source:  authors
11There is significant  variation across sectors and regions  in the incidence of iob creation and
destruction observed.  Although the case studies reveal some regularities, different sectors and regions
have responded differently to the transition in terms of job  creation and destruction.  Light industry and
the services, retail, and information technology sectors, for example, are clearly in expansion, as well as
are export-oriented and import-substituting enterprises as a  consequence of the  1998 devaluation and
increased oil prices.  More traditional manufacturing sectors, for example, heavy industry, machine tools,
and chemicals (among others), however, are still struggling to recover.  Among the eight regions visited,
there  are also significant differences  in the patterns in employment flows and enterprise restructuring.
More progressive and reform-oriented regional administrations, such as Novgorod, have promoted new
entry, enterprise restructuring and a more  flexible labor market through judicious  economic and fiscal
policies, bolstered by greater policy stability and transparency; see Box 2.  Other regions, however, have
been less helpful in creating a more favorable business environment, hampering the restructuring process.
Many  regional  administrations  employ  protectionist  policies  to  insulate  "local  champions"  from
competition, for example in hampering inter-regional trade flows.
Enterprise  restructuring  and  downsizing  is  hampered  due  to  protectionist  institutions  and
policies.  Many general directors indicated that their enterprises are still responsible for providing social
services-such  as housing, hospitals,  schools  and training centers-for  both their  current and former
employees.  This situation, a hangover Soviet corporate mentality, creates a web of deep ties between the
firm and employees that unduly complicates the restructuring process, where the ties remain even after
the formal employer-employee  relationship  is terminated.  Other transition economies, such as China,
exhibit  similar protectionist  policies,  which  have  retarded  labor reallocation.'7 Portions  of Russia's
existing employment regulations, especially the Labor Code, appear to complicate the situation further,
making it difficult for enterprises to lay off redundant employees.  On the other hand, the regulations do
have an impact on the type of contracts that employers who are faced with redundancy challenges prefer
to offer to prospective employees since employers have a strong preference for temporary and seasonal
hiring.
Box 2. Promoting Restructuring and Job Creation: The Economic Council of Novgorod
Since  the mid 1950s,  the Novgorod  region developed  as a production  center  for radio-electronics,  especially  for the
military  sector (for  many firms military  orders  accounted  for up to 70% of their production). The transition  process
led the region into a deep econormic  crisis, since most of its industry was unable to compete in a market-based
environment  because  of the halting  of military  orders;  outdated  technologies;  and lack of trained  labor.  In 1992,  the
oblast administration  reassessed  the business  environment  and decided  to launch a multi-pronged  strategy  to reduce
unemployment.  It established  the Economic Council of Novgorod with the purpose of formulating  economic
policies to revitalize the regional economy.  The Council focused on  three areas of economic policy: (1)
development  of small businesses,  so as to promote  growth  and new jobs; (2) administration  of more  effective  tax
collection,  so as to reduce the regional dependency  from the federal budget; and (3) creation of a  favorable
investment  conditions  for out-of-oblast  investors.  Whereas  the tax issues are still not resolved (the oblast is still
federally  subsidized  to the amount  of 12.5%  of its budget),  the employment  goal has met with  some success. As of
mid-2000  one fourth  of the local population  is employed  by small  businesses,  and tax receipts from SMEs  account
for one fifth of the budget revenues. The biggest success has come however from attracting  FDI to the region
(currently some US$800 million), following the adoption of several investment  promotion  programs and the
formation  of a transparent  and stable investment  policy  regime at the regional  level. In 1999 62% of the oblast's
gross product  came from ventures  with foreign  participation,  and the oblast's exports were four times  the size of its
imports.
Source:  authors
7 See  Lane,  Broadman  and Singh  (1997) for analysis  of labor  creation  and  destruction  in Chinese  enterprises.
12One of  the constraints  expanding  firms  face  is  their  abilitv  to find  expert  workers.  Many
managers interviewed report that they currently face several impediments to increase their labor force-
despite stronger demand for  their products.  In part their  attempts to  expand production capacity are
hampered by  the  lack of  skilled labor, especially  for  the newly  emerging IT and  computer sectors.
Indeed, a common complaint among general directors is the  difficulty of attracting particular types of
experts.  This is due in part to the surge in recent demand for new skills but without the matching supply
of requisite workers-for  example skills in modem management techniques and in specialized areas such
as computer software; see Box 3.  Although most firms acknowledge that a large part of the problern is
that they are unable to offer competitive wages, the shortage also is the result of constraints reflected in
limited regional mobility within the country and outdated training programs.
Box 3.  Lack of Skilled Workers -- An IT Firm in Novosibirsk Oblast
Established  in 1991,  this IT firm has expanded  rapidly over the past 10 years, growing from 3 to about 300
employees. Its growth  however  has been constrained  by the lack of available  skilled  labor in the software  field and
in modern management  techniques. Especially  since the crisis in August 1998, the firm has tried to increase  its
capacity  and compete  on the Russian  market  with foreign  enterprises. Its recruitment  efforts,  through  headhunters,
its web site newspaper  advertisements  and its informal  network,  have all been hampered  by the lack of the firm's
internal  marketing  skills  and an incomplete  strategic  vision. If possible,  in the coming  year, this firn would  like to
increase  its management  staff  by 10  percent,  and its overall  personnel  by approximately  30 percent.
Source:  authors
The lack of skilled labor is increasing the economic gaps between Russian regions.  Regions with
well-established, state-of-the-art universities, for example, Novosibirsk, appear to be restructuring at a
somewhat faster pace and attracting  investment.  Relatively few  managers indicated that  in  order to
overcome the shortage of skilled labor would the firm-at  this juncture-hire  unskilled labor and provide
in-house training, although in the case of senior positions, training would be provided to new employees.
Job  reallocation  is hampered  because workers  are  reluctant  or  face constraints  to  move  to
different regions or even within a region.  The limited availability of skilled labor is also exacerbated by
workers' unwillingness to move, especially outside urban centers, in part because of housing endowments
they enjoy in their current locality, local residency requirements that act as constraints on new worker
entrants (for example in the city of Moscow) or poor transport links.  Despite substantial improvements
since the start of the transition, worker mobility across Russia's regions is still quite limited.  This creates
unnecessary bottlenecks in the labor market, retards enterprise restructuring, and increases the wage and
economic disparities across regions.
Worker recruitment still occurs mostly through informal and personal networks.  Job creation is
unlikely to be efficiently carried out because of the lack of competitive and transparent hiring practices.
Many managers indicated that they tend  to rely more on  their personal  contacts for worker searches,
especially  when  hiring blue-collar  workers.  Using  newspaper  advertising  or head-hunters  is more
common when the firm is looking for specialized labor and senior workers.  Managers also rely heavily
on their current employees to spread by word-of-month that there are job openings in the firm and t:o  let
friends know of recruitment possibilities.
13Enterprise  restructuring  and  job  reallocation  are  also  being  stifled  because  of  obsolete
technologies and lack of financing.  Many managers acknowledge that their production lines are outdated,
inefficient and excessively labor intensive.  Yet most managers indicated extreme difficulty in obtaining
financial credit from banks or other sources, including government agencies, for medium term investment
needs  on "commercial  terms"  they  find  acceptable. Conditional  on access to  financial  capital, many
would seek to automate their production lines in the next few years.  If consummated properly and in line
with true market demand, such investments would likely translate into significant job destruction (for low
skilled jobs) and job creation (for expert personnel).
V.  Statistical Analysis: Ouantitative Evidence Across Russia's 89 Regions
Recently available firm-level data from Goskomstat covering approximately  128,000 enterprises
across  24  industrial  sectors  in  all  of the  country's  89  regions  for  the years  1996-1999 permit  new
microeconomic analysis of enterprise restructuring and labor reallocation in Russia.  Here we present the
main findings from this analysis.
Enterprise Restructuring in the Aggregate.  Table 6 summarizes key attributes of the restructuring
that has taken place among Russian enterprises between 1996 through the end of 1999.  One measure of
the  amount  of firm  restructuring  is the  change in the  number  of registered  firms between  1996-99.
Although the  change has been  small in the  aggregate, with only a  1.3% increase, there  is significant
variation across sectors.  Sectors where the number of registered firms has decreased substantially include
clothing, shoes, tanning,  firs,  electronics  and light industry.  Substantial  increases in number of firm
registries have occurred in the fishing, pulp and paper, and woodworking sectors.  Of course, number of
firms registered  is  a  (perhaps  highly)  imperfect measure  of economic  restructuring:  it contains  no
information about changes in firm scale (i.e., whether it is a large or a small firm that is registering or de-
registering) and it also may reflect administrative/legal changes rather than economic changes (i.e., when
an existing firm simply re-registers under a new name).
For these reasons it is critical to look at number of employees (columns 4 and 5 of Table 6).  First
we note that the average size firm in the Goskomstat data is 355 employees, which is slightly above the
normative definition of a "small enterprise"  in Russia (usually 250 employees'8), but in some sectors-
notably information and computer services, clothing, light industry, meat and dairy, among others-the
Goskomstat  data do  contain firms whose  average size does fit the  "small  enterprise"  definition.  In
contrast to the data on registration, the data on number of employees show that moderate downsizing-of
almost 12 percent-has  occurred in the typical firm between 1996-99.  As with the registration measure,
there is great variability across sectors in the change of number of employees.  But the data on employee
numbers give a richer picture:  for  example, in the woodworking, pulp and paper, meat and dairy, and
fishing sectors, the average number of employees per firm has in fact decreased even though the number
of  registered  firms  in  these  sectors  has  increased-suggesting  that  these  market  structures  have
rationalized and smaller firms have been entering these  businesses, a finding consistent with our case
studies,  including the  impact  of the  ruble  devaluation on  trade  sensitive  sectors.  In  light industry,
however, although there has been a decrease in the number of firms registered, the  average number of
employees per firm has increased, suggesting an upsizing in firm scale has been taking place.  In contrast,
the employee downsizing in the mechanical engineering for light industry, electronics and precision tools,
which was consistent with the decrease in registered firms in these businesses, suggests in such sectors
enterprises have been exiting from the market.
1  Within  the Russian  nomenclature  this standard  varies somewhat  across  sectors.
14Table 6.  Russian Enterprise Restructuring and Performance: 1996 - 1999
1  Number of Registered  Average Size  Reporting  Sale Revenues  Rate of  Rate of
Firms Providing  (number of employees)  year Payroll  (in '000  rubles)  Return  Return
Complete Balance  (in '000  (profits  (profits
Sheet Information' 9 rubles)  over  over
assets)  assets)
(average)  (average)  (average)  (average)
Industry  As of end 99  A(99-96)  As of end 99  A(99-96)  1999  1999  1996  1999
Ferrous metallurgy  973  -2.6%  2366  -12.3%  i  10728  149519  1.6%  39.2%
Non ferrous metallurgy  1584  15.8%  1245  -9.6%  8600  113855  19.9%  62.9%
Chemical industry  3827  18.1%  1026  -3.7%  1815  22895  -1.1%  21.5%
Mechanical engineering  2930  1.0%  718  -23.4%  2440  23309  5.8%  9.8%
Machine tool and tool  1030  -14.2%  356  -23.9%  824  6286  1.8%  8.5%
industry
Precision tool industry  1309  -12.6%  508  -30.1%  797  7078  2.1%  19.6%
Tractor and agricultural  463  -1.9%  908  -29.2%  2869  25379  4.6%  3.2%
mechanical engineering  __
Mechanical engineering  950  -6.3%  348  -47.7%  669  6643  0.2%  -11.3%
for light industry
Electronic industry  983  -20.4%  411  -43.8%  714  4888  -2.8%  9.1%
Metal construction and  3878  -0.5%  239  4.6%  271  3742  5.1%  17.9%
articles industry  4155  27_  -2116
Woodworking industry  4155  27.7%  211  -47.4%  696  4908  -7.9%  10.6%
Wood processing industry  9587  -5.2%  230  -2.6%  309  3316  -3.3%  12.4%
Pulp and paper industry  734  31.9%  788  - -22.5%  3525  54402  1  -2.3%  43.6%
Timber-chemical industry  39  2.6%  433  2.5%  1290  11389  1.5%  4.2%
Building material industry  6614  -9.5%  249  -8.8%  758  6537  2.1%  5.0%
Glass and porcelain  647  -0.5%  540  -11.5%  1236  110580  4.6%  20.7%
industry  l_ll__l__l__
Textile industry  2417  -14.9%  359  -23.1%  856  7277  -1.8%  6.7%
Clothing industry  7529  -25.4%  125  -9.6%  136  1358  2.2%  19.4%
Tanning, fur and shoes  2752  -32.5%  193  -4.7%  259  2524  -0.6%  10.6%
industry  _  I_l_l________
|Other light industry  75  -40.0%  170  26.5%  301  2210  t  0.8%  |  18.9%
'Food gustatory industry  10420  14.1%  238  5.5%  1055  15917  14.0%  31.7%
Meat  and diary  industry  4806  X  14.2%  184  -20.7%  766  16500  5.8%  7.7%
Fish industry  2562  36.4%  294  -47.3%  789  10169  -4.8%  -1.5%
Information and computer  3961  11.8%  57  5.3%  102  1556  21.9%  2.4%
services
Russia (average)  74225  1.30%  355  -11.50%  |  1028  12794  2.9%  15
Source: authors'  calculations  using  data from  Goskomstat
The effects of the 1998 devaluation and ensuing industrial growth in Russia are evident in tenys of
changes in firm performance, in particular, profitability.  As indicated in the last two columns of Table 6,
the overall average rate of return on assets increased from 2.9 percent in  1996 to  15.5 percent in  1999.
Profitability in 1999 was highest in the non-ferrous and ferrous metals, pulp and paper, and food sectors;
and losses were suffered in the mechanical engineering for  light industry and fishing sectors.  Sectors
whose rates of return declined in 1999 relative to 1996, in addition to the mechanical engineering for light
industry and fishing sectors, also include information and computer services and tractor and agricultural
19  Although  the size of our panel  data is 128,000  firms  over  four years,  only about  80,000 enterprises  provided
complete  and consistent  information  for  each of the four years. Our  analysis  and the annual  rates of  job creation  and
destruction  constructed  are therefore  based  on a set of about 80,000  enterprises.
15machinery.  The data indicate that  in  1999 greater profitability is associated with larger firm size: the
correlation between revenues and rate of return on assets is about 0.7 and is statistically significant.
Job Creation and Destruction in the Aggregate.  Table  7 and Figure 3 display the extent of job
creation, destruction, and reallocation as well as net employment growth, aggregated across all regions
and sectors for the 1996-1999 period.
The data indicate several important findings.  Except for a lull in 1998, there has been a steady
increase in the rate of job creation since 1996, especially between  1999 and  1998. But at the same time,
job destruction rates have been declining over the same period, again with a substantial drop in the 1998-
99 period.  This suggests that, all other things equal, the rate of layoffs in enterprises has been decreasing,
especially in the post-crisis period.
These two outcomes result in the fact that  although net employment growth-the  excess of job
creation  over job  destruction-in  Russia  is  still  negative,  there  is  substantially  less  negative  net
employment growth today-at  -1.6  percent-than  there was in 1996, when net employment growth was
-8.9  percent. These data also indicate, however, that although net employment growth rates are growing,
the extent of job reallocation-the  sum of job destruction and job creation rates-has  declined, suggesting
that overall  job flows in Russia's labor market are decreasing. 20
Table 7.  Russia's Job Creation, Destruction, and Reallocation; Net Employment Growth: 1996-1999
(rates in percentage)
Year/Year  Job Creation  Job Destruction  Job Reallocation  Net Employment
___  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  __  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  __  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  __G  row th
97 vs.  96  9.9  18.8  28.7  -8.9
98 vs. 97  9.7  17.7  27.4  -8
99 vs. 98  12.2  13.8  26  -1.6
Note:  Job Reallocation = Job Creation + Job Destruction; Net Employment Growth = Job Creation - Job Destruction
Source: Authors'  calculations using data from Goskomstat.  For a detailed description of the methodology and definitions, see Appendix 11. These
rates were calculated using a subset of the Goskomstat dataset because of missing data and inconsistencies.
Job Creation and Destruction: Does Firm Size Make a Difference?  A key issue is the extent to
which job creation and job destruction rates differ according to firm size. For a simple assessment of this
at the sectoral level, the correlations between average firm size in 1999 (measured either by number of
employees or sales revenues) and job creation or job destruction rates in 1999 vs  1998 are both negative,
but neither, however, is statistically significantly different from zero-suggesting  that, at this juncture in
Russia, firm size and net employment  growth do not appear to be related. 2t Figure  4 illustrates this
finding.  Of course, to investigate this question more comprehensively, there is a need to focus on within-
and cross-sectoral effects, as well as on within- and cross-oblast differences.
20 This slowing  down of the labor  market  could be attributed  in part to the evolution  of the transition  process  itself.
At the beginning  of the transition,  a large  reallocation  of resources  from inefficient  to more  efficient  uses was
necessary.  As the transition  proceeded  and resources  were reallocated,  the rate ofjob reallocation  got closer  to U.S.
and European  levels.
2' This result  does  not change  if we eliminate  outliers  from the analysis.
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17Job  Creation  and Destruction:  Does  Enterprise  Ownership Form  Matter?  There  is  great
variation in rates of job creation and destruction among firms of different ownership form; see Table 8
and  Figure 5.  Between  1996 and  1999, rates of job  creation and job destruction have been higher in
public compared to private enterprises.  For both ownership forms, however, job creation rates increased
and job destruction rates decreased between 1996 and 1999. Moreover, net employment growth has been
negative  for  public  as well  as  private enterprises  (but  less  so particularly  after  1998).  But  private
enterprises  exhibit  substantially  less  negative  net  employment  growth  than  do  their  public  sector
counterparts,  suggesting that  more  layoffs  are occurring  among  public enterprises.  Importantly,  the
differentials in net employment growth rates between the two ownership forms, however, has narrowed
significantly, from 9 percent in 1997/96 to about 3 percent in 1999/98, suggesting that the overall pace of
labor market flows is becoming more similar among public and private enterprises.
The pattems of job reallocation among enterprises with foreign ownership have been significantly
different from domestic firms.  For fully foreign owned firms, both job creation and job destruction rates
were  significantly higher than those  of domestic public  and private enterprises in the  1997-96 period
(joint ventures' rates were more in line with those of domestic firms.)  But whereas job creation rates for
domestic  firms rose between  1996 and  1999, for foreign  owned firms, they  actually  fell and  did so
significantly (though for fully foreign owned firms they still are higher than domestic enterprises).  Also
in contrast to domestic firms, net employment growth rates  were sizably positive from  1996-1998 for
fully foreign owned enterprises, but then turned sharply negative in 1999.  Importantly, joint  ventures
have exhibited the most stable job reallocation rates in the economy, and by end-1999 their rates of job
creation only barely were exceeded by their rates of job destruction.
Table 8. Job Creation, Job Destruction and Net Employment Growth by Ownership Form
Ownership Form  Job Creation  Job Destruction  Net Employment Growth
97/96  99/98  97/96  99/98  97/96  98/97  99/98
Majority Public Enterprises  17.3%  21.7%  37.3%  26.7%  -19.9%  -15.4%  -5.0%
Majority Private Enterprises  7.5%  10.8%  18.3%  13.2%  -10.9%  -8.6%  -2.4%
Fully Foreign Enterprises  122.6%  33.4%  105.8%  44.4%  50.8%  58.5%  -11.0%
Joint Ventures  17.3%  11.2%  13.3%  11.7%  4.0%  -7.3%  -0.5%
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using data  from Goskomstat
Enterprise Profitability and Employment Restructuring.  We noted above that for 1999 there is
a  statistically significant positive correlation between enterprise profitability (as measured by return on
assets) and  size (as  measured by sales revenues), a finding  consistent with  most studies of industrial
organization worldwide.  If Russia's  restructuring process-through  labor shedding and hiring-is  being
carried out efficiently, the  expectation is that profitability and net employment growth should also be
correlated, controlling for size differences.  Looking at the simple correlation it appears that there  is a
positive relation between these two variables (see figure 6).
A  simple estimation  exercise, however, provides  mix results. In a regression covering all  the
24  industry sectors of return on assets (for 1999) on (i) sales revenues (for 1999) and (ii) net employment
growth (for  1999 vs.  1998), both the estimated coefficient  on sales revenues and on  net employment
growth  are  statistically significant  (and positive), though the estimated coefficient  on  net  employment
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growth  is significant  only  at  the  10% confidence  level.12  This  seems  to  suggest  that  employment
restructuring is not occurring efficiently at this juncture  in Russian firms,  although of course because
other  elements  affect  profitability  differences  across  firms-such  as  industry-specific  structural
competitiveness factors, exposure to international trade, sectoral technologies, among other factors-it  is
difficult to make this judgment definitively based on this simple exercise.
SVectoral  Differences  in Job  Creation and Destruction.  The  new dataset  from Goskomstat
allows us to analyze in the detail differences in  job creation and destruction among the industrial sectors;
see Figure 7.  The data indicate a  great degree of sectoral variance  in employment  flow rates, both
within a  given time  period and between time  periods.  But  they  also  show for  certain sectors, some
persistency over time.  In 1996/97, job creation was greatest in information and computing services (52%)
and least in ferrous metallurgy (3%); the sector with the highest rate of job destruction was fishing (50%)
and the lowest was timber-chemical (5%). Overall in 1996/97, the highest net employment growth rate
was registered in information and computing services (24%) and the lowest was registered in fishing (
39%).  This is an enormous cross-sectoral range, as Figure 7 depicts clearly.
By  1998/99 information and computing services still registered the highest rate of job creation,
but its rank was shared by woodworking (both at 22%); similarly, ferrous metallurgy still ranked lowest,
but its rank was shared by mechanical engineering (both at 7%). Job destruction also remained lowest in
timber-chemical (7%).  These results all indicate a degree of persistency.  (The correlation between job
destruction  in  1997/96 and  1999/98 is  0.68  and  statistically significant,  but there  is no  statistically
significant correlation between job  creation  in  1997/96 and  1999/98.)  Yet  while job  destruction  in
mechanical engineering for light industry (at 26%) was the highest among the sectors, job destruction
rates in information and computer services (20%) and in woodworking (23%) were quite high on a cross-
sectoral basis but lower than they were in these particular industries in 1996/97.  The bottom panel  of
Figure 7 indicates that sectoral differences in net employment growth rates in 1996/97 were much smaller
by 1998/99, revealing some convergence.
22  The beta coefficient  for sales revenues  is 0.0003  and for net employment  growth is 0.74.  The Adjusted-W2is
0.54. We also  used lagged  net employment  growth  (1998/97) instead  ofthe contemporaneous  one,  to reduce  the
possibility  of endogeneity.  In this case,  the estimated  coefficient  for revenues  is still  positive  and statistically
significant  but the coefficient  for net employment  growth  is not statistically  different  from zero.
20Figure  7.  Russia:  Job  C reation,  D estruction,  and  Net
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21Figure 8  illustrates how job  reallocation  flows differ.  In  1996/97 job  reallocation rates were
highest in information and computer services (79%), other light industry (62%) and fishing (61%), and
lowest in  ferrous  metallurgy (12%)  and  timber  chemical  (13%).  In  1999/98,  job  reallocation  in
woodworking was  the  highest  (at  45%),  but  this  was  the  same  rate  as  in the  earlier period.  Job
reallocation rates fell in information and computer services and in fishing from 1997/96, but remained the
two highest (both at 42%) just below woodworking.  While ferrous metallurgy continued to register the
lowest  job reallocation, its rate rose a bit from 1997/96.
0.8  Figure  8.  Russia:  Job  Reallocation  by  Sector
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Regional  Variation in  Job  Creation  and  Destruction.  Among  Russia's  regions  there is
heterogeneity  in rates  of job  creation  and  destruction.  Table  9  summarizes key  variables  from the
Goskomstat data for the eight regions in which we carried out the case studies, plus four other regions for
comparison purposes.
Among  these  twelve  regions,  in  1997/96 Saratovskaya  registered  the  greatest  positive  net
employment  growth (4%)  and  Primorskii  experienced the  greatest  negative net  employment growth
(- 24%).  Both regions, however, had essentially the same rate of job reallocation flows (about 50%); yet
in  Primorskii's  case,  job  destruction  rates  greatly  outweighed  those  of  job  creation,  whereas  in
Saratoskaya,  job creation and destruction were more balanced.
The situation in  1999/98 is substantially  different on many counts.  Primorskii registered the
highest positive net employment growth rate (10%), engendered by strong job creation. At the same time,
Saratovskaya's net employment growth rate turned sharply negative (-8%), due to high job destruction,
although  Samaraskaya's  net  employment  growth  was  the  lowest  (-12%).  Moscow's  and
Novgorodskaya's net employment growth rates also reversed in 1999/98 from 1997/96 (respectively from
-12%  to  1%, and from -5%  to  1.4%), both due to higher job creation and lower job  destruction rates.
Primorskii's  and Saratovskaya's job  reallocation rates, however, remained the highest (43% and  37%,
respectively), along with Samaraskaya (38%).
22Figures 9 and  10 and illustrate the job flow patterns for the 89 Russian regions.  Across all the
regions, on average, job  creation rates rose only marginally (from  15% to  16%) between  1997/96 and
1999/98, whereas job  destruction rates  fell substantially (from 24% to  16%).  Net employment growth
rates, on average, rose significantly and turned just positive (from -9% to 1%).
On a region-by-region basis, persistency characterizes job creation, but not job destruction: while
there is a statistically significant correlation of 0.71 between job creation rates in 1997/96 and 1999/98 in
a given region, the analogous correlation between job destruction rates in 1997/96 and 1999/98 of 0.25 is
not statistically significant.
Table 9.  Russia:  Regional Job Creation and Destruction
(selected regions)
1997/96  1999/98
Region  Job  Job  Job  Net  Job  Job  Job  Net Employment
Creation  Destruction  Reallocation  Employment  Creation  Destruction  Reallocation  Growth  Rate
Rate  Rate  Rate  Growth  Rate  Rate  Rate  Rate
Kasnodarskii  8.5%  18.3%  26.8%  -9.8%  9.0%  10.7%  19.6%  -1.7%
Primorskii  13.8%  37.4%  512%  -23.5%  26.4%  16.9%  43.3%  9.5%/0
Nizhegorodskaya  8.3%  20.8%  29.1%  -12.4%  7.5%  17.0%  24.4%  -9.59/6
Samarskaya  11.3%  18.1%  29.4%  -6.8%  13.2%  25.2%  38.3%  -12.0'%
Saint-Petersburg  16.8%  22.2%  39.0%  -5.4%  10.2%  14.7%  24.9%  -4.40o
Leningradskaya  9.2%  17.90/o  27.1%  -8.7%  13.9%  14.2%  28.2%  -0.3°,S-
Moscow  10.8%  22.8%  33.6%  -12.0%  16.2%  15.2%  3 1.4%  1.00%o
Mosckovskaya  9.4%  15.9%  25.3%  -6.6%  10.3%  10.6%  20.90/o  -0.3°S
Novgorodskaya  10.3%  15.4%  25.7%  -5.0%  15.0%  13.7%  28.7%  1.4%/6
Novosibirskaya  9.4%  16.7%  26.1%  -7.2%  8.7%  12.7%  21.4%  -3.90%S
Saratovskaya  27.1%  23.1%  50.2%  4.0%  14.3%  22.5%  36.8%  -8.2%o
Sverdlovskaya  15.8%  12.8%  28.6%  3.0%  17.1%  13.7%  30.8%  340/3
Source:  Authors' calculations using data from Goskomstat
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25Compositional Differences in Worker Separation:  Variation by Reason and by Sector.  Newly
available data from the  Ministry of Labor shed light on  the trends  and variations in the  attributes of
worker separations for the period 1994 through the end of the Third Quarter of 2000. Figure 11 and Table
10 show that since 1994 the main-and  growing-form  of worker separations is "voluntary" as opposed
to  layoffs through "redundancies."  While there  is always  ambiguity in any  labor market  about what
precisely constitutes a "voluntary" separation--for  example a worker can be induced by his/her employer
to  "voluntarily" resign  or retire-the  large  and  significantly  increasing  differences between  the  two
separation categories leaves little doubt that layoffs through redundancies constitutes a small fraction of
total  worker separations in Russian  enterprises.  Across all  industries, about two-thirds of all  worker
separations in  1996 were categorized as voluntary, while less than  10 percent of total separations were
layoffs through redundancies.  By the end of the Third Quarter of 2000, the portion of total separations
that  were  voluntary  increased  to  almost  74  percent,  while  the  portion  that  were  layoffs  through
redundancies declined by more than 50 percent to below 4 percent.
Figure 11.  Separations  of Workers by Reasons, 1994-2000
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Figure 12 and Table  10 illustrate differences in the forms of worker separations for  1996, 1999
and  the  Third  Quarter  of  2000  for  representative  sectors.  In  every  sector,  except  for  non-ferrous
metallurgy and chemicals, there is a steady increase in the portion of total separations that were voluntary,
and a  steady decrease in the portion that were through redundancies. The food industry registered the
largest proportion of voluntary separations  in both  1996 and  the  Third Quarter of 2000,  while  light
industry registered the largest proportion of redundancy separations in both 1996 and the Third Quarter of
2000. Ferrous metallurgy registered the smallest proportion of both voluntary and redundancy separations
in 1996, and maintained the smallest proportion of redundancy layoffs in the Third Quarter of 2000; but
in the Thitd  Quarter of 2000,  non-ferrous metallurgy registered the  smallest proportion of voluntary
separations.
26Table 10. Separation of Workers by Reason by Sector
(percent of total number of separated)
1996  1999  End Q3 2000
Voluntary  Separation  Voluntary  Separation  Voluntary  Separation
Separations  Through  Separations  Through  Separations  Through
Redundancies  Redundancies  Redundancies
All Industries  67.0  7.9  70.7  6.0  73.8  3.5
Selected  Industries
Ferrous metallurgy  40.9  5.2  51.9  4.5  53.7  1.8
Non-ferrous metallurgy  46.5  9.8  29.4  3.3  48.6  2.5
Chemicals  53.1  13.7  53.5  6.3  59.1  3.6
Mach bldg and metal wkg  53.6  15.4  60.4  8.2  63.2  3.1
Frstry and bldg materials  59.7  8.3  61.2  4.2  64.4  2.1
Light industry  59.3  15.7  63.3  10.6  71.2  4.4
Food industry  65.2  9.1  70.1  5.8  75.4  3.8
Note: Figures do not sum to 100 percent because other reasons for separation not shown.
Source:  Ministry of Labor data
Figure 12. Separations  by Sector, Voluntary  vs. Redundancies
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27VII.  Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we have systematically documented the dynamics of job creation and destruction in
Russia  since  1996, using  recently  available data.  We  explored empirically how  the patterns  of job
creation and  destruction are related  to various aspects of enterprise restructuring across businesses in
different  sectors  and  regions,  and  with  different  ownership  forms,  size,  vintage,  and  performance
characteristics.
Our analysis relies, in part, on official firm-level data collected by Goskomstat. As is always the
case with such data on transition economies, because of limits on their representatives of the country's
overall enterprise population, the data may bias the results.  Despite these limits, these data have enabled
us to  carry out  a more  structured  and  complete statistical  investigation  of Russian job  creation  and
destruction and enterprise restructuring than has been performed in the past.  This quantitative assessment
has been complemented by a series of qualitative business case studies we carried out in eight of Russia's
regions during 2000.
The case study analysis suggests there is significant heterogeneity across firms and regions.  In
broad terms, the case study evidence suggests that job destruction has taken place, but in some sectors and
regions only to a limited degree, in large part due to institutional and incentive constraints and a still-
widespread "socialist"  corporate culture.  At the same time, the  case  studies indicate job creation has
materialized, particularly in sectors where the import-substitution effects of the  1998 ruble devaluation
have been most pronounced, but still only slowly, mostly because of limited regional mobility and the
lack of skilled workers.
Thus  the  qualitative  evidence  suggests  that  the  incentives  and  constraints  on  enterprise
restructuring and  the operation  of the  labor  market in  Russia are  a  function of the  initial economic
conditions  at  the start  of the  country's  transition  and the  institutional  environment.  Today Russia's
economy manifests a hangover from the earlier drive for regional autarky and self-sufficiency, with large
firms exhibiting excessive vertical  integration, protected by  local government barriers to  interregional
trade  and investment.  In turn, throughout the more than  eight years following the dismantling of the
Soviet system, the regionally-specialized  structure of the economy has had a  profound impact on the
response of the country's labor market to the reform process.
As in the past, labor turnover appears higher within regions than across regions.  This is in large
part  likely  due  to  the  existence  of  institutional  constraints,  for  example  in  arranging  for  housing
accommodations.  But the institutions and regulations directly governing the labor market greatly affect
job  reallocation by  either  creating incentives  or imposing  constraints on  employers'  and employees'
decisions.  Although the 1971 Soviet version of the Labor Code, which contains a myriad of detailed rules
regulating many aspects of the employer-employee relationship, in practice has had  less of an impact
since 1991 due to discrepancies between the code's  unrealistically rigid provisions and the needs  of a
growing market  economy,  it  is  still  an  impediment to  a  flexible  labor market.  In  addition to  the
anachronistic Labor Code, the  inadequacy of the social safety net and significant political pressures-
especially  at  the  local  level-also  constrain  labor  movements  and  prevented  the  much  needed
restructuring of firms.
For the main part of the quantitative analysis we used firm-level data from Goskomstat that cover
approximately 128,000 enterprises across 24 industrial sectors in all of the country's  89 regions for the
years 1996-1999. Some of our main findings are as follows.
One measure of the amount of firm restructuring is the change in the number of registered firms
between 1996-99. Although the change has been small in the aggregate, with only a 1.3% increase, there
28is  significant variation  across  sectors.  Sectors where  the  number  of registered  firms has  decreased
substantially include clothing, shoes, tanning, furs, electronics and light industry.  Substantial increases in
number of firm registries have occurred in the fishing, pulp and paper, and woodworking sectors.
In the aggregate, the typical firm in Russia has experienced only modest downsizing-about  12
percent-in  terms of number of employees in the four year period. As with the registration measure, there
is great variability  across sectors  in the change of  number of employees. But  the  data on  employee
numbers give a richer  picture: for example, in the  woodworking, pulp and paper, meat and dairy, and
fishing sectors, the average number of employees per firm has in fact decreased even though the number
of  registered  firms  in  these  sectors  has  increased-suggesting  that  these  market  structures  have
rationalized and smaller firms have been entering  these businesses, a finding consistent with our  case
studies, including  the  impact  of the  ruble  devaluation  on  trade  sensitive sectors.  In  light industry,
however, although there has been a decrease in the number of firms registered, the average number of
employees per firm has increased, suggesting an upsizing in firm scale has been taking place.  In contrast,
the employee downsizing in the mechanical engineering for light industry, electronics and precision tools
sectors, which was consistent with the decrease in registered firms in these businesses, suggests in such
sectors enterprises have been exiting from the market.  Thus, we find evidence of particular sectors where
there has been new entry by smaller firms and exit by larger, mature businesses.
Except for a lull in 1998, there has been a steady increase in the rate of job creation since 1996,
especially between 1999 and 1998.  But at the same time, job destruction rates have been declining over
the same period, again with a substantial drop in the  1998-99 period.  This means that, all other things
equal, the rate of layoffs in enterprises has been decreasing, especially in the post-crisis period.
There  is also  a degree of persistency in job  creation and destruction rates  across sectors  and
across regions.  Interestingly, there appears to be persistency in job destruction on a cross-sectoral basis
but persistency in job  creation on a cross-regional basis:  (i) on a sector-by-sector basis, the correlation
between job  destruction  in  1997/96 and  1999/98 is 0.68 and  statistically significant, but there  is no
statistically significant correlation between job creation in  1997/96 and 1999/98; on a region-by-region
basis, while there is a statistically significant correlation of 0.71 between job creation rates in 1997/96 and
1999/98, the analogous correlation between job destruction rates in 1997/96 and  1999/98 of 0.25 is not
statistically significant.
Overall  rates of return on assets rose from about 3 in  1996 to about  15 percent by end-1999,
reflecting the strengthening economy.
Worker  separations  made  on  a  "voluntary"  basis  remain  the  main-and  growing-form  of
layoffs, constituting three-fourths  of total separations, while layoffs  made through redundancies  are a
shrinking form of separations, constituting about 4 percent of total separations.
While the data suggest that, on average, firm size and net employment growth are not statistically
related, ownership  form  does seem to  matter:  more  layoffs  are occurring in  public than  in private
enterprises, although the differentials in net employment growth rates between the two ownership groups
have narrowed considerably over time.  Foreign-affiliated enterprises exhibit higher average job creation
and destruction rates than their domestic counterparts; but in contrast to domestic firms, job creation rates
by foreign businesses in Russia have dropped between 1996-99.
Although  firm  size  is  found  to  be  statistically  correlated  (positively)  with  profitability,
restructuring through changes  in net employment  growth does not appear to  be related  statistically to
profitability. This suggests that there are efficiency improvements needed in the restructuring process.
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31ADpendix 1 Firm-Level Data Sources and Measurement Issues
In this study we use only firm-level data.  They were derived from approximately 70 case studies
carried  out in the  field  in  eight  Russian  regions as  well  as  data from the  Russian  State  Statistical
Committee  (Goskomstat)  The  case  study  data  are  described  in  the  text.  Here  we  described  the
Goskomstat data set.
Our primary source of data on gross employment is Goskomstat through its Accounting Balance
Survey of registered enterprises.  These data are collected through mandatory yearly reporting by large
and medium sized enterprises, which cover some 75 percent of total employment. 23 The data set covers
all types of ownership including fully state-owned enterprises, as well as newly privatized and de-novo
private firms.
The data used in this study are derived from this larger data set and include information on 128,244
registered enterprises between  1996 and  1999.  Our data set, though it covers all  89 Russian regions,
focuses only on a subset of sectors of the economy, in the manufacturing and service sectors. The data set
includes  information  at  the  firm-level  on  employment,  product,  location,  size,  average  wage  bill,
ownership and other characteristics.
This rich data set has however a few limitations.  First, since small enterprises are excluded, the
most dynamic part of the economy is under-represented.  This creates a bias in our measure of job flows.
Secondly, the  data do  not provide  information on  the firm's  vintage nor do they  distinguish between
continuing enterprises, start-ups and  shut-offs.  Thirdly, this  is enterprise-level rather than  plant-level
data.  Thus, job movements between (and within) plants of the same enterprise are not captured in our
calculations.  This is a serious limit especially when addressing the issue of changes in the enterprise's
productivity.  Fourthly, this data is collected only on a yearly basis.  The point-in-time nature of this data
does not allow us therefore to capture employment changes that are reversed within the same sampling
period.
23  Small  enterprises  in Russia are subject  to a different  and simpler  system  of reporting.
32Appendix 2 Basic Definitions
For the purpose of the analysis presented in this paper, we used the following definitions:
(Gross) Job creation at time t: the employment gains summed over all the firms that expand or start up
between t-l  and t.
(Gross) Job destruction at time t: the employment losses summed over all firms that contract or shut down
between t- I and t.
Net employment change at time t: the difference between employment at time t and employment at time t-
1.
(Gross) Job reallocation at  time  t: the sum of  all firm-level  employment  gains and  losses that occur
between t- l and t.
(Gross)  Worker reallocation  at time  t: the  number  of persons  who  change place of  employment  or
employment status between t-l  and t.
Excess job reallocation at time t: the difference between gross job reallocation and the absolute value of
the net employment change.
Job creation and destruction can be expressed as rates by dividing by a measure of sector size.  Following
Davis,  Haltiwanger and  Shuh  (1997),  we  choose  to  use  as  a  measure  of  sector  size the  average
employment between period t and t-l  (i.e. [E(t) + E(t-1)]/2) rather than lagged employment (E(t-l)).  This
allows us to calculate rate measures that range  from -2.0  to +2.0, rather than from -1.0  to  + infinity,
portraying expansion and  contraction symmetrically.  Thus, for example, firm  startups and shutdowns
have growth rates of +2.0 and -2.0 rather than + infinity and -1.0.
33Policy  Research Working  Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2615  Trade,  Growth,  and Poverty  David  Dollar  June  2001  E. Khine
Aart Kraay  37471
WPS2616 Reforming  Land  and Real  Estate  Ahmed  Galal  June  2001  D. Dietrich
Markets  Omar  Razzaz  34995
WPS2617 Shanghai  Rising  in a Globalizing  Shahid  Yusuf  June  2001  S. Yusuf
World  Weiping  Wu  82339
WPS2618 Globalization  and  the Challenge  Shahid  Yusuf  June  2001  S. Yusuf
for Developing  Countries  82339
WPS2619  Do Banks  Provision  for Bad Loans  Michele  Cavallo  June  2001  E. Mekhova
in Good  Times?  Empirical  Evidence  Giovanni  Majnoni  85986
and Policy Implications
WPS2620  Who  Owns  the Media?  Simeon  Djankov  June  2001  R. Sugui
Caralee  McLiesh  37951
Tatiana  Nenova
Andrei  Shleifer
WPS2621 Does  Indonesia  Have  a  "Low-Pay"  Deon  Filmer  June  2001  H. Sladovich
Civil Service?  David  L. Lindauer  37698
WPS2622  Community  Programs  and  Women's  David  Coady  June  2001  L.  Wang
Participation:  The Chinese  Experience  Xinyi  Dai  37596
Limin  Wang
WPS  2623  Trade  Liberalization  in China's  Elena  lanchovichina  June  2001  L.  Tabada
Accession  to the  World  Trade  Will Martin  36896
Organization
WPS2624 Are Incentives  Everything?  Payment  Varun  Gauri  June  2001  H. Sladovich
Mechanisms  for Health  Care  Providers  37698
in Developing  Countries
WPS2625  Australia's  Experience  with Local  Garry  Pursell  June  2001  L.  Tabada
Content  Programs  in the Auto  Industry:  36896
Lessons  for India  and Other  Developing
Countries
WPS2626  Mandatory  Severance  Pay: Its  Donna  MacIsaac  June  2001  H. Sladovich
Coverage  and  Effects  in Peru  Martin  Rama  37698
WPS2627  With  the Help  of One's  Neighbors:  Harold  Alderman  June  2001  P. Sader
Externalities  in the Production  Jesko Hentschel  33902
of Nutrition  in Peru  Ricardo  SabatesPolicy  Research Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2628  Monopoly  Power  and  Distribution  in  Hanan  G. Jacoby  June  2001  P. Kokila
Fragmented  Markets:  The  Case  of  Rinku  Murgai  33716
Groundwater  Saeed  Ur  Rehman
WPS2629  Bridging  the Digital  Divide:  How  George  R.  G. Clarke  July 2001  P.  Sintim-Aboagye
Enterprise  Ownership  and Foreign  37644
Competition  Affect Internet  Access
in Eastern  Europe  and  Central  Asia
WPS2630  Parallel  Imports  of Pharmaceutical  Mattias  Ganslandt  July 2001  L.  Tabada
Products  in the European  Union  36896
WPS2631  Pension  Reform  in Hungary:  Roberta  Rocha  July 2001  L. Gross
A Preliminary  Assessment  Dimitri  Vittas  37030
WPS2632  Human  Capital  and  Growth:  The  Sebastien  Dessus  July 2001  K. Mazo
Recovered  Role  of Education  Systems  39744
WPS2633  Bank Privatization  in Argentina:  George  R.  G. Clarke  July 2001  P. Sintim-Aboagye
A Model  of Political  Constraints  and  Robert  Cull  37644
Differential  Outcomes
WPS2634 Chile's  Regional  Arrangements  and  Glenn  W. Harrison  July 2001  L. Tabada
the Free  Trade  Agreement  of  the  Thomas  F. Rutherford  36896
Americas:  The Importance  of Market  David  G. Tarr
Access
WPS2635 Optimal  Use of Carbon  Sequestration Franck  Lecocq  July 2001  V. Soukhanov
in a Global  Climate  Change  Strategy: Kenneth  Chomitz  35721
Is There  a Wooden  Bridge  to a Clean
Energy  Future?
WPS2636  Processes,  Information,  and  Javier  Campos-Mendez  July 2001  G. Chenet-Smith
Accounting  Gaps  in the Regulation  Antonio  Estache  36370
of Argentina's  Private  Railways  Lourdes  Trujillo
WPS2637  Technical  Efficiency  Gains from  Antonio Estache  July 2001  G. Chenet-Smith
Port  Reform:  The  Potential  for  Marianela  Gonzalez  36370
Yardstick  Competition  in Mexico  Lourdes  Trujillo
WPS2638  On Financing  Global  and International  Todd  Sandler  July 2001  S. Kpundeh
Public  Goods
WPS2639  Public  Policy  toward  Nongovernmental  William  Jack  July 2001  H. Sladovich
Organizations  in Developing  Countries  37698
WPS2640  Where  Has  All the Foreign  Investment  Harry  G. Broadman  July 2001  S. Craig
Gone  in Russia?  Francesca  Recanatini  33160